## 1NC

### 1NC DA

#### The House will pass a clean debt ceiling

National Review Online 9/19/13 ("The Corner, Lowry: House Will Pass Clean Debt Limit Raise")

The effort to use the debt ceiling as leverage to defund Obamacare will come to naught, National Review editor Rich Lowry said tonight.¶ During an appearance on Special Report’s All-Star Panel, Lowry predicted that the House would eventually pass a “clean” debt limit raise despite drama in the Senate related to the effort to defund Obamacare.¶ “It goes to the Senate, there’ll be some theatrics, Harry Reid will strip out the defunding from the [continuing resolution], it’ll go back to the House and probably end up passed in a clean version,” Lowry said.

#### The plan is a huge loss for Obama –Democrats cracking down on war powers makes Obama look weak costs pc

Paterno 6/23/2013 (Scott, Writer for Rock the Capital, “Selfish Obama” http://www.rockthecapital.com/06/23/selfish-obama/)

Now we have a Democratic president who wants to make war and does not want to abide by the War Powers Resolution. But rather than truly test the constitutionality of the measure, he is choosing to simply claim that THIS use of US military power is not applicable.¶ This is an extraordinarily selfish act, and one liberals especially should fear. POTUS is setting a precedent that subsequent presidents will be able to use – presidents that the left might not find so “enlightened.” Left as is, President Obama has set a standard where the president can essentially attack anywhere he wants without congressional approval for as long as he wants so long as he does not commit ground forces.¶ That is an extraordinarily selfish act. Why selfish? Because the president is avoiding congress because he fears a rebuke – from his own party, no less. The politically safe way to both claim to be decisive and to not face political defeat at the hands of Democrats – a defeat that would signal White House weakness – is to avoid congress all together. Precedent be damned, there is an election to win after all.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling has economic ripple effects – investor uncertainty

Masters 13 (Jonathan, Deputy Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, jan 2 2013"US Debt Ceiling. Costs and Consequences")

Most economists, including those in the White House and from former administrations, agree that the impact of an outright government default would be severe. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has said a U.S. default could be a ["recovery-ending event"](http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/01/bernanke-warns-on-debt-limit-chaos/) that would likely spark another financial crisis. Short of default, officials warn that legislative delays in raising the debt ceiling could also inflict significant harm on the economy.¶ Many analysts say congressional gridlock over the debt limit will likely sow significant uncertainty in the bond markets and place upward pressure on interest rates. Rate increases would not only hike future borrowing costs of the federal government, but would also raise capital costs for struggling U.S. businesses and cash-strapped homebuyers. In addition, rising rates could divert future taxpayer money away from much-needed federal investments in such areas as infrastructure, education, and health care.¶ The protracted and politically acrimonious debt limit showdown in the summer 2011 prompted Standard and Poor's to take the unprecedented step of downgrading the U.S. credit rating from its triple-A status, and analysts fear such brinksmanship in early 2013 could bring about similar moves from other rating agencies.¶ A 2012 study by the non-partisan Government Accountability Office estimated that [delays in raising the debt ceiling](http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-701) in 2011 cost taxpayers approximately $1.3 billion for FY 2011. BPC estimated the ten-year costs of the prolonged fight at roughly $19 billion.¶ The stock market also was thrown into frenzy in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2011 debt limit debate, with the [Dow Jones Industrial Average](http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/news/2011/08/08/slideshow-dows-10-worst-days-ever.html) plunging roughly 2,000 points from the final days of July through the first days of August. Indeed, the Dow recorded one of its worst single-day drops in history on August 8, the day after the S&P downgrade, tumbling 635 points.¶ Speaking to the [Economic Club of New York](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/idUSW1E8KA00A20121120) in November 2012, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke warned that congressional inaction with regard to the fiscal cliff, the raising of the debt ceiling, and the longer-term budget situation was creating uncertainty that "appears already to be affecting private spending and investment decisions and may be contributing to an increased sense of caution in financial markets, with adverse effects on the economy."

#### Impact is global nuclear war

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greaterconflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### T

#### Definition - The phrase “introduce USAF into hostiltities is directly out of the War Powers Resolution – Armed Forces is clearly meant ONLY to apply to people being introduced

Lorber 13 (University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law¶ January, 2013¶ University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law¶ 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961¶ LENGTH: 21211 words COMMENT: Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power? NAME: Eric Lorber\* BIO: \* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science.)

C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations  
   
As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution - especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation - are the definitions of key terms, particularly "**armed forces**," as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President "introduc[es **armed forces**] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent ... hostilities," [n172](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n172) or if such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces." [n173](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n173) The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys **armed forces** "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States **Armed Forces** equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." [n174](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n174) As is evident, the definition of "armed forces" is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The **definition of "hostilities**," which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention, [n175](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n175) particularly in the recent Libyan conflict, [n176](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n176) will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if "**armed forces**" exist in the situation.

As is evident from a textual analysis, [n177](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n177) an examination of the legislative history, [n178](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n178) and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, [n179](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n179)  [\*990]  "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "**armed forces**," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States **Armed Forces'** includes the assignment of members of such **armed forces** to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n180) While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of **armed forces**," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n181) Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n182) By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). [n183](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n183) Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.

An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central  [\*991]  Intelligence Agency). [n184](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n184) This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, [n185](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n185) but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, [n186](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n186) suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. [n187](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n187) While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. [n188](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n188) As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." [n189](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n189) The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, [n190](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n190) as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. [n191](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n191) The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into **hostilities**.

This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in  [\*992]  harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. [n192](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n192) Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. [n193](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n193) If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. [n194](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.292573.8310389867&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17871237223&parent=docview&rand=1375063406119&reloadEntirePage=true#n194) As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Violation – The affirmative restricts the use of a weapons system not people exchanging fire.

#### Voting Issue

#### Limits – there are thousands of weapons systems – space based lazers, different types of nuclear weapons, different types of delivery systems – there are an infinite number of potential targets or sets of targets

#### Ground – Nuclear weapons literature is fundamentally BROADER in nature – it also was NOT part of the core topic discussion as a community or part of the topic paper – this allows the affirmative HUGE potential advantage ground eviscerating the generics of the negative.

### CP

#### The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should declare the adoption of a No Use Policy.

#### Announcing the policy solves and is perceived by tying the US’s reputation to sticking to NFU

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, "No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy", International Security Volume 35, Number 2, Fall 2010, Project Muse)

Skeptics of the believability of NFU underestimate the international and domestic audience costs incurred by a clear NFU commitment.121 By making an NFU policy public, perhaps in the form of a presidential press conference accompanied by a formal document, the United States would increase the credibility of NFU by tying its reputation to the sustainment of and adherence to the commitment. The objective would be to bolster the credibility of an NFU policy by ensuring that noncompliance would have unacceptably high political costs.¶ A violation of NFU would likely have substantial domestic, and especially [End Page 45] international, political ramifications. Domestically, a president’s purposeful violation of an NFU pledge could incentivize the political opposition to rally strongly against the violation, providing an opportunity for vocal political opponents to generate attention and potentially bring independent voters and moderate members of the opposite political party into their camp. Internationally, breaking an NFU commitment risks damaging the United States’ reputation for honoring its commitments.122 If the United States were unwilling to adhere to its public policies regarding something as important as nuclear weapons, states might calculate that they could not trust the United States at its word. Such beliefs could weaken confidence in U.S. commitments to other unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral declarations and agreements; give states pause in considerations about entering into new agreements with the United States; and create strong doubts about the sincerity of future U.S. declaratory policies. In addition, the breach of NFU could undermine U.S. long-term security. Nuclear first use would signal that the United States believes that nuclear weapons have military utility and is willing to employ them regardless of the political costs, thereby potentially encouraging further proliferation in an attempt to deter future U.S. nuclear attacks.¶ To be sure, in the midst of an intense crisis U.S. decisionmakers, especially the president, would need to repeat and reinforce the commitment to NFU, lest an opponent fear that the United States could suddenly change its nuclear policy. During a severe crisis or a limited conventional conflict with a nucleararmed adversary, U.S. leaders would need to make frequent public statements that U.S. nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence of nuclear attacks, and nuclear retaliation would be swift and severe if the opponent chooses to use nuclear weapons. Even more important, in a crisis the United States would have to carefully coordinate its declaratory policy and actions, especially with regard to alerting nuclear forces. If in a crisis an opponent perceives the alert status of U.S. nuclear (and conventional) forces as too high, the leadership might be inclined to believe that NFU is a bluff and the United States is preparing for a possible first strike. Consequently, to enhance the credibility of NFU in a crisis, U.S. decisionmakers would need to pay careful attention to the alert status of both U.S. nuclear forces and those of the opponent and ensure that, at a maximum, the alert status of U.S. forces were raised on a tit-for-tat basis with the opponent. In such cases, the president could announce a decision to raise [End Page 46] the alert level of U.S. forces as a reciprocal response to the adversary’s actions, while reinforcing the U.S. commitment to NFU.¶ Conclusion¶ Arguments for a U.S. policy of no first use have traditionally been met with fierce resistance from some elements of the defense and foreign policy communities. Policymakers and defense planners are always reluctant to deprive the commander in chief of any potential military options. Yet a fundamental tenet of deterrence theory, first articulated and popularized by Thomas Schelling, is that limiting one’s options can be beneficial for deterrence and strategic stability.123 By foreclosing the U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first, NFU would enhance crisis stability, bolster conventional deterrence, and provide the United States with renewed political legitimacy and leverage as the leader of the global nonproliferation regime. For the United States, the continued threat to use nuclear weapons first is either militarily useless or potentially destabilizing, and the actual use of nuclear weapons first is politically untenable and militarily dangerous.

#### Congressional control is bad

#### a) Budget fights cause ineffective congressional control of nuclear weapons

Schwartz 08 (Stephen I. Schwartz is Editor of The Nonproliferation Review and WMD Junction, Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons", http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/congressional-oversight-nuclear-weapons/, October 01, 2008)

With few exceptions, Congress has historically shown little interest in nuclear weapons matters except where budgets or constituent needs are concerned.[1] Those members that did follow the issue either chaired a relevant committee or subcommittee or represented a state or district housing one or more nuclear weapons installations.¶ Congressional oversight can have two connotations—to look over and to overlook. Too often, Congress, by its own admission, has practiced the latter. Given that U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs have consumed at least $7.5 trillion (in adjusted 2005 dollars) since 1940 this is surprising, until one realizes that insufficient oversight contributed to Congress' lack of knowledge about the overall scale of the program. In fact, congressional scrutiny of nuclear weapons programs can be characterized as a story of extremes—long periods of inattention punctuated by short periods of concern and action. In general, Congress has taken action following a crisis or scandal (real or perceived), which typically focuses significant media or public attention on a specific problem.¶ In 1984, then Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia), a member of the Armed Services Committee since 1972, told a reporter, "The budget cycle drives the Congress, and the Congress drives the executive branch to such an extent that we don't have time to think about strategy. We never had a strategy hearing since I've been in the Senate."[2] Four years later, amidst mounting revelations that the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons facilities were unsafe to both workers and the general public, Representative John Spratt (Democrat of South Carolina), told a reporter, "In truth, most of our time is spent on the annual budget process and we have little left for oversight."[3] In fact, the last hearings in the House of Representatives on nuclear strategy were in the mid-1990s and the last Senate hearing was before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1980 and concerned President Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive 59, which mandated more flexible nuclear strike options and stated that U.S. nuclear forces must be able to find and win a protracted nuclear war.[4]¶ This inattention and lack of sustained focus led to critical disconnects between what Congress thought it was achieving with U.S. nuclear policy and what was actually happening. One of the most striking of these concerns the popular notion in the 1950s that nuclear weapons provided "a bigger bang for a buck."[5] Policymakers assumed that because a conventional bomb could kill tens or a few hundred people while one nuclear weapon could kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people, nuclear weapons were therefore more cost effective.[6] Because the Soviet Union was believed to field superior conventional forces, and because it was felt that the United States could engage in a conventional arms race with the Soviet Union and remain financially solvent, nuclearizing conventional forces was considered an ideal solution. But neither Congress nor the military leaders that supported this policy (largely for their own parochial reasons) understood that this was a gross oversimplification and that in many ways nuclear weapons were more expensive than conventional ones. Moreover, nuclear weapons never replaced conventional weapons, so the theoretical savings were never realized. Yet after authorizing a massive expansion in the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the early 1950s (largely in response to the Korean War), Congress never examined or reevaluated its assumptions, even after military leaders began to realize they were mistaken.[7]

#### b) Secrecy, lack of resources, and bureaucracy make Congress ineffective

Schwartz 08 (Stephen I. Schwartz is Editor of The Nonproliferation Review and WMD Junction, Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons", http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/congressional-oversight-nuclear-weapons/, October 01, 2008)

In addition, as we have seen many members feel they lack the knowledge necessary to understand these programs (the abolition of the congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1994 by the newly-elected Republican majority did not help matters). The secrecy surrounding many nuclear programs also serves as a formidable barrier to acquiring knowledge from the often reluctant executive branch, conducting oversight, or engaging in discussions with colleagues or constituents. With so many more pressing matters on their agenda, and with few places to turn for on the job training, members gravitate to issues they know. Personal and committee staff resources are also limited, so that staffers typically cover several broad issues areas, constraining their ability to focus in a sustained and effective way on nuclear weapons.¶ And finally, the organizational structure of Congress divides jurisdiction for nuclear weapons issues among dozens of committeejjjjs and subcommittees, preventing anyone from being able to see the big picture. The annual budget authorization and appropriation process also ensures that most of the attention will be on the proposed budget and what it will buy and not on the policies use to justify the spending programs in those budgets.

### 1NC K

#### The 1AC’s threats are not real or objective but are filtered through a lens of threat-action discourse – that causes violence

**Grondin 4** (David, Masters in Political Science & Ph.D. Candidate – University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies)

Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

#### Security logic causes devaluation and extinction

Burke 7 (Anthony, lecturer of IR at U New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” December 7, <http://www.hopkins-debate.com/pdf/Burke.pdf>)

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 # We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 # There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 # And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology # If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 # By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 # Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. # Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 # Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. # Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. # Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 # This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.

#### The alt is to vote negative to critique the aff’s security discourse as a prior question – framing comes first

**Cheeseman and Bruce 96** (Graeme, Senior Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert, editor, widespread author on security, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Solvency

#### No Japan proliferation now

Westlake 12 (Adam Westlake is a reporter for the Japan Daily Press, "No plans to revise Japan’s nuclear weapons principles, says new foreign minister", http://japandailypress.com/no-plans-to-revise-japans-nuclear-weapons-principles-says-new-foreign-minister-3120691/, December 31, 2012)

Japan’s new Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida stated this weekend that the Cabinet of newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has no plans to make changes to the country’s principles on nuclear weapons. The three rules prohibit the possession, manufacturing, or storage of any nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, something that even prevents U.S. ships carrying the restricted arms from docking at the nation’s ports.

#### NFU and extended deterrence are Key to Japan’s participation in the NPT – Lack of US guarantee means they go Nuclear

Scott D. **Sagan** is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation **6/1/2009 “**The Case for No First Use” Survival Vol. 51 Issue 3

#### Given the current superiority of the United States in conventional military force, there are few credible scenarios in which America and its allies would face defeat in a major conventional war. The maintenance of US nuclear ‘extended deterrence’ commitments to key allies who face nuclear neighbours, however, remains both a central security interest for the United States and an essential non-proliferation tool. This is certainly true in East Asia, where Japanese and South Korean security and their responses to North Korean nuclear developments will be strongly influenced by their perceptions of the reliability of US alliance commitments, as well as their beliefs about whether the US government has behaved responsibly in the ongoing crises with North Korea. Former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa argued in 1998 after the first North Korean nuclear crisis that ‘it is in the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan withdraw from the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear umbrella’.11 Recognition of the continued importance of US nuclear security guarantees was clearly behind then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s trip to Tokyo after the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test, when she assured the government that ‘the United States has the will and the ability to meet the full range of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan’.12

#### Obama will circumvent Congress and the courts

**Kumar 3-19**-13 [Anita, White House correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, former writer for The Washington Post, covering Virginia politics and government, and spent a decade at the St. Petersburg Times, writing about local, state and federal government both in Florida and Washington, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.Ue18CdK1FSE>]

“The expectation is that they all do this,” said Ken Mayer, a political science professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison who wrote “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power.” “That is the typical way of doing things.”¶ But, experts say, Obama’s actions are more noticeable because as a candidate he was critical of Bush’s use of power. In particular, he singled out his predecessor’s use of signing statements, documents issued when a president signs a bill that clarifies his understanding of the law.¶ “These last few years we’ve seen an unacceptable abuse of power at home,” Obama said in an October 2007 speech.. “We’ve paid a heavy price for having a president whose priority is expanding his own power.”¶ Yet Obama’s use of power echoes that of his predecessors. For example, he signed 145 executive orders in his first term, putting him on track to issue as many as the 291 that Bush did in two terms.¶ John Yoo, who wrote the legal opinions that supported an expansion of presidential power after the 2001 terrorist attacks, including harsh interrogation methods that some called torture, said he thought that executive orders were sometimes appropriate – when conducting internal management and implementing power given to the president by Congress or the Constitution – but he thinks that Obama has gone too far.¶ “I think President Obama has been as equally aggressive as President Bush, and in fact he has sometimes used the very same language to suggest that he would not obey congressional laws that intrude on his commander-in-chief power,” said Yoo, who’s now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley. “This is utterly hypocritical, both when compared to his campaign stances and the position of his supporters in Congress, who have suddenly discovered the virtues of silence.”¶ Most of Obama’s actions are written statements aimed at federal agencies that are published everywhere from the White House website to the Federal Register. Some are classified and hidden from public view.¶ “It seems to be more calculated to prod Congress,” said Phillip J. Cooper, the author of “By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action.” “I can’t remember a president being that consistent, direct and public.”¶ Bush was criticized for many of his actions on surveillance and interrogation techniques, but attention has focused on Obama’s use of actions mostly about domestic issues.¶ In his first two years in the White House, when fellow Democrats controlled Capitol Hill, Obama largely worked through the regular legislative process to try to achieve his domestic agenda. His biggest achievements – including a federal health care overhaul and a stimulus package designed to boost the economy –came about with little or no Republican support.¶ But Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in 2010, making the task of passing legislation all the more difficult for a man with a detached personality who doesn’t relish schmoozing with lawmakers. By the next year, Obama wasn’t shy about his reasons for flexing his presidential power.¶ In fall 2011, he launched the “We Can’t Wait” campaign, unveiling dozens of policies through executive orders – creating jobs for veterans, adopting fuel efficiency standards and stopping drug shortages – that came straight from his jobs bills that faltered in Congress.¶ “We’re not waiting for Congress,” Obama said in Denver that year when he announced a plan to reduce college costs. “I intend to do everything in my power right now to act on behalf of the American people, with or without Congress. We can’t wait for Congress to do its job. So where they won’t act, I will.”¶ When Congress killed legislation aimed at curbing the emissions that cause global warming, Obama directed the Environmental Protection Agency to write regulations on its own incorporating some parts of the bill.¶ When Congress defeated pro-union legislation, he had the National Labor Relations Board and the Labor Department issue rules incorporating some parts of the bill.¶ “The president looks more and more like a king that the Constitution was designed to replace,” Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said on the Senate floor last year.¶ While Republicans complain that Obama’s actions cross a line, experts say some of them are less aggressive than they appear.¶ After the mass shooting in Newtown, Conn., in December, the White House boasted of implementing 23 executive actions to curb gun control. In reality, Obama issued a trio of modest directives that instructed federal agencies to trace guns and send information for background checks to a database.¶ In his State of the Union address last month, Obama instructed businesses to improve the security of computers to help prevent hacking. But he doesn’t have the legal authority to force private companies to act.¶ “The executive order can be a useful tool but there are only certain things he can do,” said Melanie Teplinsky, an American University law professor who’s spoken extensively on cyber-law.¶ Executive actions often are fleeting. They generally don’t settle a political debate, and the next president, Congress or a court may overturn them.¶ Consider the so-called Mexico City policy. With it, Reagan banned federal money from going to international family-planning groups that provide abortions. Clinton rescinded the policy. George W. Bush reinstated it, and Obama reversed course again.¶ But congressional and legal action are rare. In 1952, the Supreme Court threw out Harry Truman’s order authorizing the seizure of steel mills during a series of strikes. In 1996, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed an order by Clinton that banned the government from contracting with companies that hire workers despite an ongoing strike.¶ Obama has seen some pushback.¶ Congress prohibited him from spending money to move inmates from the Guantanamo Bay U.S. naval base in Cuba after he signed an order that said it would close. A Chinese company sued Obama for killing its wind farm projects by executive order after he said they were too close to a military training site. A federal appeals court recently ruled that he’d exceeded his constitutional powers when he named several people to the National Labor Relations Board while the Senate was in recess.¶ But Obama appears to be undaunted.¶ “If Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations,” he told Congress last month, “I will.”

### Launch Authority

#### No accidental launch

Williscroft ‘10 (Six patrols on the *John Marshall* as a Sonar Technician, and four on the *Von Steuben* as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on *Ortolan* & *Pigeon* – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on *Oceanographer* and *Surveyor*. “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm, 2010)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

#### No WMD terror- recruitment/lethality tradeoff

Shapiro, 13 – Princeton University politics and international affairs professor

[Jacob N., Ph.D. Political Science, Association for Analytic Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies faculty fellow, Center for Economic Research in Pakistan research fellow, Princeton University Empirical Studies of Conflict Project co-director, Council on Foreign Relations member, World Politics associate editor, "The Business Habits of Highly Effective Terrorists," Foreign Affairs, 8-14-13, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139817/jacob-n-shapiro/the-business-habits-of-highly-effective-terrorists?page=show, accessed 8-18-13, mss]

In addition to being a ruthless jihadist, Ayman al-Zawahiri long ago earned a reputation for being a terrible boss. When he took over al Qaeda in 2011, senior U.S. intelligence officials were already pointing out his penchant for micro-management. (In one instance in the 1990s, he reached out to operatives in Yemen to castigate them for buying a new fax machine when their old one was working just fine.) Reports that last week’s terror alert was triggered when Zawahiri reached out to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, his second-in-command and the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula -- a communication that Washington predictably managed to intercept -- only hardened the impression that he lacks the savvy to run a global terror organization. But few of Zawahiri’s many critics have paused to consider what the task of leading a terror organization actually entails. It is true that Zawahiri’s management style has made his organization vulnerable to foreign intelligence agencies and provoked disgruntlement among the terrorist rank and file, not to mention drawing last week’s drone strikes. But it is equally true that Zawahiri had few other options. Given that terrorists are, by definition, engaged in criminal activity, you would think that they would place a premium on secrecy. But historically, many terrorist groups have been meticulous record keepers. Members of the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group active in the 1970s and early 1980s, report having spent more time accounting for their activities than actually training or preparing attacks. From 2005 through at least 2010, senior leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq kept spreadsheets detailing salary payments to hundreds of fighters, among many other forms of written records. And when the former military al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef had a dispute with Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, an explosives expert for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, in the 1990s, one of his complaints was that Umar failed to turn in his receipts for a trip he took with his family. Such bureaucracy makes terrorists vulnerable to their enemies. But terrorists do it anyway. In part, that is because large-scale terror plots and extended terror campaigns require so much coordination that they cannot be carried out without detailed communication among the relevant actors and written records to help leaders track what is going on. Gerry Bradley, a former terrorist with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, for example, describes in his memoir how he required his subordinates in Belfast in 1973 to provide daily reports on their proposed operations so that he could ensure that the activities of subunits did not conflict. Several leaders of the Kenyan Mau Mau insurgency report that, as their movement grew in the early 1950s, they needed to start maintaining written accounting records and fighter registries to monitor their finances and personnel. But the deeper part of the answer is that the managers of terrorist organizations face the same basic challenges as the managers of any large organization. What is true for Walmart is true for al Qaeda: Managers need to keep tabs on what their people are doing and devote resources to motivate their underlings to pursue the organization’s aims. In fact, terrorist managers face a much tougher challenge. Whereas most businesses have the blunt goal of maximizing profits, terrorists’ aims are more precisely calibrated: An attack that is too violent can be just as damaging to the cause as an attack that is not violent enough. Al Qaeda in Iraq learned this lesson in Anbar Province in 2006, when the local population turned against them, partly in response to the group’s violence against civilians who disagreed with it. Terrorist leaders also face a stubborn human resources problem: Their talent pool is inherently unstable. Terrorists are obliged to seek out recruits who are predisposed to violence -- that is to say, young men with a chip on their shoulder. Unsurprisingly, these recruits are not usually disposed to following orders or recognizing authority figures. Terrorist managers can craft meticulous long-term strategies, but those are of little use if the people tasked with carrying them out want to make a name for themselves right now. Terrorist managers are also obliged to place a premium on bureaucratic control, because they lack other channels to discipline the ranks. When Walmart managers want to deal with an unruly employee or a supplier who is defaulting on a contract, they can turn to formal legal procedures. Terrorists have no such option. David Ervine, a deceased Irish Unionist politician and onetime bomb maker for the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), neatly described this dilemma to me in 2006. “We had some very heinous and counterproductive activities being carried out that the leadership didn’t punish because they had to maintain the hearts and minds within the organization,” he said, referring to a period in the late 1980s when he and the other leaders had made a strategic calculation that the Unionist cause was best served by focusing on nonviolent political competition. In Ervine’s (admittedly self-interested) telling, the UVF’s senior leaders would have ceased violence much earlier than the eventual 1994 cease-fire, but they could not do so because the rank and file would have turned on them. For terrorist managers, the only way to combat those “counterproductive activities” is to keep a tight rein on the organization. Recruiting only the most zealous will not do the trick, because, as the alleged chief of the Palestinian group Black September wrote in his memoir, “diehard extremists are either imbeciles or traitors.” So someone in Zawahiri’s position has his hands full: To pull off a major attack, [they need]~~he needs~~ to coordinate among multiple terrorists, track what his operatives are doing regardless of their intentions, and motivate them to follow orders against their own maverick instincts. Fortunately for the rest of us, the things terrorists do to achieve these tasks **sow the seeds of their undoing**. Placing calls, sending e-mails, keeping spreadsheets, and having members request reimbursements all create opportunities for intelligence agencies to learn what terrorists are up to and then disrupt them. In that way, Zawahiri’s failures are not just a reflection of his personal weaknesses but a case study in the inherent limits that all terror groups face. That is good news, of course, for potential terror targets: As long as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies remain vigilant, **there is no way terrorist** organization**s** **will ever rise above the level of** the **tolerable nuisance**, which is what they have been for the last decade. But for aspiring terror managers, it is a dispiriting reminder that **there is no escape from the red tape that** ultimately **dooms their cause**.

[Matt note: gender-modified]

### Deference

#### Courts have historically gotten involved in military cases – even recently

Fisher, 6 (Louis, is Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project. Previously he worked for four decades at the Library of Congress as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers (Congressional Research Service, from 1970 to 2006) and Specialist in Constitutional Law (the Law Library, from 2006 to 2010) , he taught full-time at Queens College for three years, later he taught part-time at Georgetown University, American University, Catholic University law school, Indiana University, Catholic University, the College of William and Mary law school, and Johns Hopkins University. Currently he is a Visiting Professor at the William and Mary law school, “Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power,” Indiana Law Review, 5/2006, p.p. 1221-1223)

From the Vietnam War to the present, there has been a growing consensus that federal courts lack both the jurisdiction and the competence to decide war power disputes. I have heard this sentiment directly from political science professors, law professors, and federal judges. Such a cramped view finds no support in the first 150 years of U.S. history, when courts regularly accepted and decided such cases, sometimes for the President, sometimes against. It was only with Vietnam that courts began to avoid the merits of war power cases by invoking a variety of threshold tests, including standing, mootness, ripeness, the political question doctrine, and prudential considerations.138 I am familiar with only one war power (actually commander in chief) case that the Supreme Court deliberately ducked over this period of 150 years.139 The State of Mississippi sought to enjoin President Andrew Johnson from using the military to implement two Reconstruction Acts. The Court worried what would happen if Johnson refused to comply with its order. Did the Court have the power (legal or political) to enforce its process? Federal courts had faced that prospect before without flinching. The Johnson case was doubly difficult because if Johnson complied with the Court order and became subject to impeachment by acting in contempt of congressional statutes, would the Court then step in to support Johnson in opposition to the House? Of course if the House impeached Johnson and the matter moved to a Senate trial, the Chief Justice would preside. All in all, the dispute was one to avoid. But other than the Johnson case, federal courts regularly received war power disputes and disposed of them on the merits. There was nothing about war power cases that disqualified the judiciary. They presented statutory and constitutional questions as did other cases. The notion that courts are poorly suited to decide war power and foreign affairs issues does not emerge until after World War I. The legal literature began to treat matters of foreign policy, war, and peace as beyond the scope of judicial cognizance. That position appeared in a series of law review articles in the 1920s.140 Still, federal courts continued to take war power cases and decide them, as in the Steel Seizure case of 1952.141 The war in Vietnam and Southeast Asia sparked dozens of lawsuits challenging the President’s authority to wage war without a formal declaration or explicit authorization from Congress. Initially, federal courts dismissed these cases on the grounds that they posed a political question, they represented an unconsented suit against the United States, or the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Supreme Court regularly denied petitions seeking its review of the questions involved. For the first time in its history, federal courts were using the political question doctrine on a regular basis to avoid fundamental constitutional questions about the war power. By the early 1970s, however, federal courts seemed ready to reach the merits of the constitutionality of America’s involvement in Indochina and to assert the judiciary’s competence to decide such questions.142 Following the end of the Vietnam War, lawsuits continued to challenge presidential authority to conduct military operations without authorization from Congress. Federal judges fell back on various threshold tests to avoid deciding the dispute: ripeness, mootness, political questions, equitable discretion, and standing. Many of the cases failed in court because they were brought by members of Congress. Federal judges regularly informed the lawmakers that if they wanted to resort to litigation they had to first exhaust the institutional remedies available to them, including voting to deny authorization or funding.143 The doctrinal incoherence among federal judges on war power issues is illustrated by a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of President Clinton’s decision in 1999 to order the bombing of Yugoslavia without congressional authorization. A district court held that lawmakers lacked standing because their complaint––the alleged “nullification” of congressional votes––was not sufficiently concrete. To gain standing, legislative plaintiffs had to allege that their votes had been “completely nullified” or “virtually held for naught.”144 The case would have been ripe for judicial determination if Congress had directed Clinton to remove U.S. forces and he had refused, or if Congress had withheld funds for the air strikes in Yugoslavia and he had decided “to spend that money (or money earmarked for other purposes) anyway.”145 The D.C. Circuit affirmed on the same ground of lack of standing. It concluded that the lawmakers lacked standing because they possessed legislative power to force the President to withdraw U.S. troops, to cut off funds, or to impeach the President if he disregarded congressional authority.146 The appellate decision is interesting because the three judges wrote separate opinions based on very different legal doctrines. To Judge Silberman, no one had a legal right to challenge the President’s use of military force. Such claims were nonjusticiable because courts lacked discoverable and manageable standards to decide questions related to the War Powers Clause.147 Judge Tatel rejected the view that the case posed a nonjusticiable political question or that there was a lack of manageable standards. He believed that the case presented purely legal issues, calling on the courts to determine the proper constitutional allocation of power between Congress and the President.148 The sweeping assertions of presidential power after 9/11 led to challenges in federal courts and eventually prompted the Supreme Court’s decisions on June 28, 2004. Writing for the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor rejected the government’s position that separation of powers principles “mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts.”149 A state of war, she said, “is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”150 This decision, with Justices scattering in different directions, provided few clear standards for the lower courts, but at least eight members of the Court rejected the notion that the judiciary lacks institutional competence to participate in constitutional questions of war.151

#### Alt causes to cred-

#### Syria was the mortal blow

**Foxman 9-12**-13 [Abraham, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, holds a JD law degree from the New York University School of Law, “It’s Iran, stupid -- how to guarantee US credibility remains after Syria crisis,” <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/09/12/its-iran-stupid-how-to-guarantee-us-credibility-remains-after-syria-crisis/>]

It has become conventional wisdom that the roller coaster of American decision-making on the Syria issue has dealt a significant, if not mortal blow, to American credibility and leadership in the world.¶ This perception is not without good reason. ¶ When President Obama first established a "red line" in Syria on their use of chemical weapons, it was seen as a way to avoid or postpone any decision on U.S. intervention on the side of the rebels against the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad.¶ Then, after the chemical attack that left many dead, and the president’s commitment to military action in response, his sudden turnabout in going to Congress raised further questions. ¶ Then followed a third twist in the road, with a difficult congressional vote looming, when the president announced qualified support for a Russian proposal to monitor, control and eventually dismantle the Syrian chemical store. All of which left many people questioning the administration’s ability to be taken seriously as a leader on many global challenges.

#### Gun violence

**Freedland 9-17**-13 [Jonathan, award-winning journalist for The Guardian, the New York Times and the New York Review of Books, was named columnist of the year in the 2002 What the Papers Say awards and in 2008 was awarded the David Watt prize for journalism, “Washington DC shootings: America's gun disease diminishes its soft power,” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/17/washington-dc-shootings-america-gun-disease>]

If this isn't a matter of national security, what is? When 13 people end up dead at a US military base, that surely crosses the threshold – putting America's problem with guns into the category reserved for threats to the mortal safety of the nation. At its narrowest, Monday's massacre at the Washington navy yard is a national security issue because it involved hostile entry into what was meant to be a secure military facility. Plenty will now focus on how a man twice arrested in gun-related incidents was able to gain such easy access to the nerve centre of the US navy. There will be inquiries into the entry-pass system, use of contractors and the like.¶ But that would be to miss the wider point. America's gun sickness – which has turned massacres of this kind into a fairly regular, rather than exceptionally rare occurrence – endangers the US not solely because it can lead military personnel to lose their lives, nor even because it can lead to the murder of schoolchildren, as it did at Sandy Hook elementary school last year, or the death of young movie-goers, as it did in Aurora, Colorado, also last year – dreadful though those losses are.¶ The foreign policy experts who gather in the thinktanks and congressional offices not far from the navy yard often define national security to encompass anything that touches on America's standing in the world. That ranges from its ability to project military force across the globe to its attractiveness, its "soft power". For decades, this latter quality has been seen as one of the US's primary assets, central to its ability to lead and persuade other nations.¶ But America's gun disease diminishes its soft power. It makes the country seem less like a model and more like a basket case, afflicted by a pathology other nations strive to avoid. When similar gun massacres have struck elsewhere – including in Britain – lawmakers have acted swiftly to tighten controls, watching as the gun crime statistics then fell. In the decade after the rules were toughened in Australia in 1996, for example, firearm-related homicides fell by 59%, while suicides involving guns fell by 65%.¶ But the US stays stubbornly where it is, refusing to act. When President Obama last tried, following the deaths of 20 children and six staff at Sandy Hook at the end of 2012, his bill fell at the first senate hurdle. He had not proposed banning a single weapon or bullet – merely expanding the background checks required of someone wanting to buy a gun. But even that was too much. The national security pundits who worry how a US president is perceived when he is incapable of protecting the lives of innocent Syrians abroad should think how it looks when he is incapable of protecting the lives of innocent Americans at home.¶ On guns, the US – so often the world leader in innovation and endeavour – is the laggard, stuck at the bottom of the global class. Bill Clinton perfectly distilled the essence of soft power when he said in 2008, "People the world over have always been more impressed by the power of our example than by the example of our power." He was right. But every time a disturbed or angry individual is able to vent his rage with an assault weapon, killing innocents with ease, the power of America's example fades a little more.

#### PRISM

**Arkedis 6-19**-13 [Jim, Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and was a DOD counter-terrorism analyst, “PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-for-american-soft-power/277015/>]

Shifting attitudes and quiet reauthorization flies in the face of the standard the president has set for himself. In a 2009 speech at the National Archives, Obama emphasized the importance of the consent of the governed in security affairs,¶ "I believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values... My administration will make all information available to the American people so that they can make informed judgments and hold us accountable."¶ The president's inability to live up to this ideal is particularly jarring as he defends PRISM. Following the leaks, he's said he is pushing the intelligence community to release what it can, and rightly insists that the NSA is not listening in on Americans' phone calls. Those are helpful steps, but should have been raised during the National Archives speech just months into his administration, not six months into his second term.¶ Director of National Intelligence James Clapper continues to argue that disclosure of collection methods will give America's enemies a "'playbook' to avoid detection." That's thin gruel. First, America's enemies are already aware of the NSA's extensive electronic surveillance capabilities. That's why Osama Bin Laden and deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi used a complex network of couriers rather than electronic communications. It's typical operational security of truly dangerous operatives. Second, Obama stated as recently as late May that the threat from al Qaeda's core operatives has decreased significantly, shifting to less deadly cells scattered throughout the Middle East and North Africa.¶ The lack of public debate, shifting attitudes towards civil liberties, insufficient disclosure, and a decreasing terrorist threat demands that collecting Americans' phone and Internet records must meet the absolute highest bar of public consent. It's a test the Obama administration is failing.¶ This brings us back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM is technically legal, the lack of recent public debate and support for aggressive domestic collection is hurting America's soft power.¶ The evidence is rolling in. The China Daily, an English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, is having a field day, pointing out America's hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did with Jim Crow. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei made the link explicitly, saying "In the Soviet Union before, in China today, and even in the U.S., officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people should learn from history is the need to limit state power."¶ Even America's allies are uneasy, at best. German Chancellor Angela Merkel grew up in the East German police state and expressed diplomatic "surprise" at the NSA's activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8 meetings. The Italian data protection commissioner said the program would "not be legal" in his country. British Foreign Minister William Hague came under fire in Parliament for his government's participation.¶ If Americans supported these programs, our adversaries and allies would have no argument. As it is, the next time the United States asks others for help in tracking terrorists, it's more likely than not that they will question Washington's motives.

#### We’ll mishandle credibility on war powers- all influence is militarized

**Takacs ‘13** [Stacy Takacs is associate professor and director of American studies at Oklahoma State University. Her research focuses on the intersections of popular and political cultures in the contemporary United States, and her work has appeared in such journals as Cultural Critique, Spectator: Journal of Film and Television Criticism, Journal of Popular Culture, Feminist Media Studies, and Cultural Studies, “Real War News, Real War Games: The Hekmati Case and the Problems of Soft Power,” <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v065/65.1.takacs.html>]

When Barack Obama was elected to the presidency in 2008, he promised to implement a “smarter” foreign policy strategy that balanced the use of hard and soft power assets on a situational basis. As if to affirm the demotion of hard power, he jettisoned the name “Global War on Terror” and adopted “Overseas Contingency Operation.”1 To speak of “visual culture and the war on terrorism,” then, is something of an anachronism. Yet, arguably, visual media play an even more important role now that soft power has been embraced as a complement to war. And, make no mistake, Obama’s “smart power” strategy is not a campaign to end war or replace it with diplomacy. As former CIA chief Michael Hayden recently declared, Obama’s foreign policy is the same as Bush’s, “but with more killing.”2 Like its forerunners, the Obama administration seeks to perpetuate American power and influence; it is just willing to do so by any means necessary. Thus smart power is less a departure from hard power than an extension of it into new realms.¶ The case of Amir Mirzaei Hekmati, a US citizen recently arrested in Iran, convicted of spying for the CIA, and condemned to death, all for his association with the online gaming company Kuma Games, provides some insight into the shifting terrain of geopolitics in the information age. Specifically, it illustrates a change in the conceptions of hard and soft power, such that the two have become virtually indistinguishable. This change both derives from and perpetuates a broader move toward the militarization of the social field, which has important consequences for our capacity to imagine a condition of peace. Popular media have certainly played a role in this process by glorifying military institutions and exploits and celebrating soldier-subjects and their behaviors. As I argued in Terrorism TV, films, video games, and television shows have helped position militarism at the center of public policy and social life in the United States, and this process has been going on for decades.3 Kuma Games, which makes the online gaming series Kuma/War, figured prominently in that discussion. Following Roger Stahl, I argued that such games work like [End Page 177] advertisements for the military lifestyle, interpellating players into a military mind-set and turning them into “virtual citizen-soldiers,” ready to accept the legitimacy of hard power and willing to apply it to virtually any social problem. What I failed to ask at the time was how militarization might affect other populations: as a tool of soft power, how might such games help shape the field of geopolitical engagement? How might the militarization of social life, pursued in and through US popular culture, influence others in the global mediascape?¶ The Hekmati case brings such questions to the fore and begs us to think more deeply about the nature of soft power in the contemporary context. Hekmati’s arrest should be situated in relation to two recent and troubling trends in US foreign policy. The first is the militarization of public diplomacy under the aegis of the war on terrorffff. As State Department budgets have atrophied, military budgets have exploded, leaving the military as the only government entity with the operational capacity to engage foreign populations on behalf of the state. But military information operations tend to be short-term and highly instrumental, targeting populations to achieve a strategic advantage. Militarized public diplomacy treats information as a weapon and, thus, makes cross-cultural dialogue hard to sustain. The second trend multiplies and extends the first, for the privatization of militarism enables all sorts of independent actors to carry the banner for the US Armed Forces. Video games are an important example of this trend, for the most popular games are still the military-themed first-person shooters, which reduce geopolitics to a conflict structure and invite players to duke it out for supremacy. Diplomacy and compromise are not even options.¶ Together these trends raise the following questions: What happens when soft power resources are used like weapons, “to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG [US government] interests, policies, and objectives?”4 Will the United States be able to wield influence if its communications and diplomacy operations look and feel like psychological operations? And what will happen to international relations if hard power logics are placed at the center of cross-cultural exchange? If the military story becomes the only story US culture is interested in telling or selling, where does that leave non-Americans? The case of Amir Hekmati embodies this collapse of public and private, hard and soft power assets and thus can illuminate the likely outcome of the United States’ decision to privilege power over communication and exchange in the information age.¶ Netwar on Iran¶ Iran has been an early testing ground for the use of soft power to achieve instrumental, hard power goals. Since the 1979 revolution, the United States [End Page 178] has not had formal diplomatic relations with the Iranian regime. As a result, contacts have been irregular and informal, and all of them “have been used, either overtly or covertly, to promote regime change.”5 In 2006 the Bush administration established an Office of Iranian Affairs inside the State Department to coordinate its “transformational diplomacy” operations. The office received $66 million from Congress to “promote freedom and human rights in Iran.” Some of that money was used to establish Persian-language radio and TV operations under the Voice of America banner; the rest went “to support the efforts of civil-society groups” and dissidents operating inside Iran to promote democracy and effect regime change.6 Such overt attempts at public diplomacy were supplemented by an expansion of covert military and intelligence operations in the country. In 2007 President George W. Bush signed a presidential finding authorizing an increase in reconnaissance expeditions to “[gather] information [and] [enlist] support” for regime change efforts in the country. Congress provided $400 million to support these efforts, much of which went to fund attacks on Iranian security forces by extremist groups like Jundullah (a group the US State Department has labeled a terrorist organization).7 US Special Forces in Iraq, meanwhile, stepped up cross-border raids into Iran with the aim of kidnapping or killing high-ranking members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.8¶ The Obama administration came to power promising to reestablish formal diplomatic ties with Iran, but was forced by circumstances to embrace an equally informal combination of public diplomacy and covert military adventurism. Obama did eliminate the so-called Democracy Fund and has toned down the “regime change” rhetoric, but US funding for both overt and covert operations in the region has actually increased under his watch.9 He has authorized a “broad expansion of clandestine military activity” in the Middle East, including operations to gather “reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes . . . if tensions over [Iran’s] nuclear ambitions escalate.”10 In 2011 he helped the Israelis unleash a computer virus that wiped out up to one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, and he has authorized the target killing of Iranian nuclear scientists.11¶ Is it any wonder, then, that Iran has replied to these provocations with its own militarized campaign to counter and contain US influence in the region? When the United States began funneling money to prodemocracy groups inside Iran, the Ahmadinejad regime responded with a coordinated propaganda campaign to tar all such groups as CIA stooges.12 It instituted a crackdown on activists, teachers, intellectuals, women’s rights groups, and labor leaders, accusing them of receiving support from the United States and thus of committing treason. When the US Congress responded by appropriating [End Page 179] $30 million to document and publicize human rights abuses inside Iran, the Iranian authorities countered with their own $20 million program to expose human rights violations in the United States.13 Since then, Iran has banned or blocked access to cable, Internet, and cell phone transmissions during periods of strife and, under the guise of the “Iranian Cyber Army,” redirected Twitter and Facebook traffic to websites carrying anti-American slogans. The Iranian authorities have imposed stringent Internet filters and firewalls to preempt political speech in cyberspace and launched their own cyberattacks on sensitive computer systems in Israel and the United States.¶ The Hekmati case must be placed squarely within this context of low-intensity conflict, or netwar. According to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, netwar is “a comprehensive information-oriented approach to social conflict,” which extends the field of battle into civil society and blurs once-distinct boundaries between offense and defense, soldiers and civilians, combat operations and diplomatic endeavors.14 The concept is designed to account for the entry of nonstate actors into the fields of war and diplomacy and to describe how information works as a weapon within this extensive field of combat. On the one hand, information technologies can be used to create deep coalitions predicated on shared values or interests. Al-Qaeda’s use of the Internet to recruit soldiers and financial supporters is a model for this aspect of netwar. On the other hand, information can also be used as a weapon to confuse the enemy and preemptively deprive it of support. Tiziana Terranova has argued that the US response to the 1979 Iranian revolution was an early example of this strategy. US media outlets portrayed the revolutionaries as irrational zealots and the US hostages as sympathetic civilians in need of rescue. The resulting images bombarded viewers’ senses, provoking affective responses (revulsion, pity, anger) that short-circuited any attempt at rational argument or political dialogue. By “focus[ing] all public attention on building up a wave of resentment against the Iranians,” the State Department ensured the United States would assume the moral high ground.15 It was a technique for producing, rather than speaking to, a public. Thus it was not propaganda but information warfare. The truth or falsity of the representations mattered less than their capacity to mobilize a pro-US public.¶ Arguably, this is the role that public diplomacy serves in the contemporary era. It is no longer about communicating values, exchanging information, or enlightening foreign publics; it is about “stirring people up” and controlling the battle space. The Iranian authorities seem to understand this quite well, which is why they have made popular culture into a prominent battleground in their low-intensity conflict with the United States. Viewing US entertainment [End Page 180] media as Trojan horses, they have banned American music, censored Hollywood films, prohibited the use of satellite dishes, shut down Facebook, and, most recently, pulled Barbie from store shelves for promoting “destructive” cultural and social habits. In one sense, Hekmati’s arrest is just an extension of such cultural warfare. In another sense, however, it is a deepening of that conflict, for it acknowledges the role of privatized commercial culture in the militarization of the social field. Like the state, Kuma/War and other such militarized video games frame politics in warlike terms. They produce a conflict structure that attracts others and ends up trapping the United States in its own nets/netwars.¶ Militarized Gaming as Information Warfare¶ In a videotaped “confession” aired on Iranian state TV, Hekmati admitted to receiving military intelligence training and working for Kuma Games, which he portrayed as a CIA front operation. The real aim of Kuma Games is not to entertain, he said, but “to convince the people of the world and Iraq that what the US does in Iraq and other countries is good and acceptable.”16 Among other things, Hekmati worked on game modules for the online series Kuma/ War, which the website describes as “an interactive chronicle of the War on Terror.”17 Each ten- to fifteen-minute “episode” allowed subscribers to replay military engagements from the recent past, using logistical material supplied by a team of military advisers. Popular episodes included “Operation Anaconda,” “Fallujah: Operation Al Fajr,” and “The Death of Osama Bin Laden.” Three episodes have focused on Iran and likely raised the hackles of Hekmati’s captors: a two-part series called “Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” focused on “Operation Eagle Claw,” the aborted Delta Force mission to rescue US hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran during the 1979 revolution, and the speculative fiction “Assault on Iran,” which is described as “the most plausible scenario [for] delaying or destroying Iran’s nuclear arms capabilities.” More so than other episodes, these give a good sense of what Kuma/War is really about: chronicling US conflict so that players can invent or remake history as it suits them.¶ Like other military-themed video games, Kuma/War places players in the shoes of the US military and asks them work through logistical information to achieve a mission. To enhance the realism, each episode is framed by a range of documentary intertexts, from faux news reports to logistical data, satellite imagery, and interviews with military experts and actual participants in the events. For example, the “Iran Hostage Rescue Mission” modules are framed by interviews with “the CIA’s former ‘Master of Disguise,’ Antonio Mendez” (he of the caper at the heart of the new film Argo). The series’ motto is “Real War [End Page 181] News. Real War Games,” but the ads for the site invite players to “re-create the news” and “remake history.”18 And, as the Iran modules demonstrate, there is plenty of room to make history up as you go. “Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” for example, is predicated on the understanding that you will succeed where US Delta Forces originally failed, and “Assault on Iran” invites players to live history before it happens. Likewise, Jennifer Terry reports that Kuma/War’s gamed version of the 2004 Marine assault on Fallujah (“Fallujah: Operation Al Fajr”) transforms US soldiers into protectors of Iraqi civilians trapped inside the battle zone. Though in reality it was the US military cordon that trapped the civilians in the first place and the US soldiers who constituted the gravest threat to their survival, in Kuma’s version, you get to be the defender, not the aggressor.18¶ As these examples illustrate, there is nothing subtle about Kuma/War’s biases. If it really was a CIA propaganda operation, one wonders why Kuma Games would bother making it seem like a private corporation.20 More likely, Iran’s attempt to draw attention to the games is not about the content or ownership but about the way video games, in general, have come to direct and modulate global attention. Games like Army of Two, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, and the Battlefield series all share an orientalist imaginary, which identifies Arabs and Muslims as enemies of the United States and constructs US heroism through their extermination. As propaganda, they are fairly ham-fisted, but as weapons in an information war over how to frame contemporary conflicts, they effectively mobilize enmity against Middle Eastern populations and produce publics willing to support US militarism as a solution to the problem.¶ The Iranian authorities know full well that games like these are not state propaganda. However, they are also unwilling to let them stand unchallenged as a historical framework. By identifying Kuma Games as a CIA front operation, I think they mean to reframe the US story about its endeavors in the Middle East, thereby depriving the United States of “its attractiveness and legitimacy” in the eyes of others. In other words, the Hekmati arrest is an information operation designed to “[create] a disabling environment” for the delivery of US messaging.21 Iran and its allies are also taking their case against such games to the players themselves. In response to Kuma/War’s “Assault on Iran,” for example, the Association of Islamic Unions of Students in Iran designed its own game called Special Operation 85: Hostage Rescue. It is a first-person shooter game in which players work to free two Iranian nuclear scientists kidnapped by the United States. The Central Intelligence Bureau of Hezbollah has also created two first-person shooters (Special Force 1 and 2) that allow players to replay key battles from the conflicts between Lebanon and Israel in the 1980s and [End Page 182] 2006. Here, the Israelis are the enemy, and Hezbollah are the heroic underdogs from whose perspective the battles are fought.22¶ Kuma CEO Keith Halper describes these game design wars as a new form of political debate. “We have made a point,” he says, “they have responded.”23 Yet both Eastern and Western war-themed games tend to use a “shoot-and-destroy mechanic” that promotes a faith in militarism as the solution to all sorts of social problems. As a message about geopolitics, these games privilege a conflict-structure that is appealing in its simplicity and satisfying in its emotional charge. They are the video game equivalents of President Bush’s framing of the US response to 9/11 as a “war” on terror. Such phrasing may have been designed to empower and reassure distraught Americans, but the administration failed to take into the account the problem of multiple audiences. Al-Qaeda was attracted by this framing. It, too, prefers to see the world in warlike terms and has been more than happy to adopt the slogan for its own recruiting efforts. Indeed, a case can be made that the war frame helped Al-Qaeda more than it inspired the United States and its allies. Certainly it has fueled resentment against the United States and fostered a generation of angry young men who see guns and bombs as their salvation.¶ Conclusion¶ In his defense of “smart power,” Joseph Nye makes an impassioned case for the increased use of soft power to achieve American foreign policy objectives. “Promoting democracy, human rights, and development of civil society,” he argues, is “not best handled with the barrel of a gun.”22 True enough, but does the language of power in any manifestation really suit these objectives? Even if US diplomacy were not thoroughly militarized, would not the recourse to words like “soft power” and “smart power” still privilege coercion over persuasion, compulsion over attraction, militarism over diplomacy? The recent cultural wars with Iran, including the arrest of Amir Hekmati, expose the limits of the new smart power philosophy of global engagement. The low-intensity, tit-for-tat struggle to shape the interpretation of American power reveals a fundamental coherence between Iran and the United States around the question of power politics. Iran has clearly been attracted to and persuaded by the US framing of geopolitics as a militarized power struggle. This has not resulted in enhanced US credibility or trust, however. Instead, the use of soft power as a weapon has subverted cross-cultural dialogue and exchange and made peace harder to attain. Just ask Amir Hekmati—if he survives his current tour of duty on the front lines of contemporary netwar.

#### Stability will survive without US hegemony

Fettweis ‘10 (Chris Fettweis, Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books)

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs states have decided that their interest are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidentalffff. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

### DA

#### Countering Threats - First Use is critical to NATO forces and deterrence.

**The Guardian 2008** (Jan. 22) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/22/nato.nuclear>

The West must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the "imminent" spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, according to a radical manifesto for a new NATO by five of the West's most senior military officers and strategists.

Calling for root-and-branch reform of NATO and a new pact drawing the U.S., NATO and the European Union together in a "grand strategy" to tackle the challenges of an increasingly brutal world, the former armed forces chiefs from the U.S., Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands insist that **a "first strike" nuclear option remains an "indispensable instrument" since there is "simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world."**¶ The manifesto has been written following discussions with active commanders and policymakers, many of whom are unable or unwilling to publicly air their views. It has been presented to the Pentagon in Washington and to NATO's secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, over the past 10 days. The proposals are likely to be discussed at a NATO summit in Bucharest in April.¶ "The risk of further [nuclear] proliferation is imminent and, with it, the danger that nuclear war fighting, albeit limited in scope, might become possible," the authors argued in the 150-page blueprint for urgent reform of Western military strategy and structures. "**The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction."fff**¶The authors - General John Shalikashvili, the former chairman of the U .S. joint chiefs of staff and NATO's ex-supreme commander in Europe; General Klaus Naumann, Germany's former top soldier and ex-chairman of NATO's military committee; General Henk van den Breemen, a former Dutch chief of staff; Admiral Jacques Lanxade, a former French chief of staff; and Lord Inge, field marshal and ex-chief of the general staff and the defense staff in the U.K. - **paint an alarming picture of the threats and challenges confronting the West in the post-9/11 world and deliver a withering verdict on the ability to cope.**¶The five commanders argue that the West's values and way of life are under threat, but the West is struggling to summon the will to defend them.¶ The key threats include political fanaticism and religious fundamentalism; the "dark side" of globalization, meaning international terrorism, organized crime and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; climate change and energy security, entailing a contest for resources and potential "environmental" migration on a mass scale; the weakening of the nation state as well as of organizations such as the U.N., NATO and the E.U.¶ To prevail, the generals call for an overhaul of NATO decision-taking methods, a new "directorate" of U.S., European and NATO leaders to respond rapidly to crises, and an end to E.U. "obstruction" of and rivalry with NATO.¶ Among the most radical changes demanded are a shift from consensus decision-taking in NATO bodies to majority voting, meaning faster action through an end to national vetoes; the abolition of national caveats in NATO operations of the kind that plague the Afghan campaign; no role in decision-taking on NATO operations for alliance members who are not taking part in the operations; the use of force without U.N. security council authorization when "immediate action is needed to protect large numbers of human beings."¶ In the wake of the latest row over military performance in Afghanistan, touched off when the U.S. Defense secretary Robert Gates said some allies could not conduct counter-insurgency, the five senior figures at the heart of the Western military establishment also declare that NATO's future is on the line in Helmand province.¶ "NATO's credibility is at stake in Afghanistan," said Van den Breemen.¶ **"NATO is at a juncture and runs the risk of failure,"** according to the blueprint.¶ Naumann delivered a blistering attack on his own country's performance in Afghanistan. "The time has come for Germany to decide if it wants to be a reliable partner." By insisting on "special rules" for its forces in Afghanistan, the Merkel government in Berlin was contributing to "the dissolution of NATO."¶ Ron Asmus, head of the German Marshall Fund thinktank in Brussels and a former senior U.S. state department official, described the manifesto as "a wake-up call." "This report means that the core of the NATO establishment is saying we're in trouble, that the West is adrift and not facing up to the challenges."¶ Naumann conceded that the plan's retention of the nuclear first strike option was "controversial" even among the five authors. Inge argued that "**to tie our hands on first use or no first use removes a huge plank of deterrence."**

#### Unified NATO is necessary to fight terrorist threats in Pakistan and Afghanistan

**VOA News**, **2009** (“Biden Says NATO Unity Needed to Fight Terrorists in Afghanistan”, <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-03/2009-03-10-voa28.cfm?CFID=249039126&CFTOKEN=58011356&jsessionid=8430185dfd3fa15f4e87765f5b6e3a810524>, SP)

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden is calling for a strong and united NATO to fight terrorist threats coming from Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Biden spoke at the Brussels headquarters of the Atlantic alliance, telling NATO members he is in Brussels to listen and to consult - particularly about how to keep Afghanistan and Pakistan from becoming havens for terrorists.   The United States is putting new focus on Afghanistan, adding more troops and looking for greater European support to counter the Taliban insurgency.   **Biden said it is critical the Atlantic alliance forge a common strategy to a common threat. "The United States believes we share a vital security interest in meeting that challenge; each of our countries has a vital interest from the point of view of the United States in meeting that challenge,**" he said. " The deteriorating situation in the region poses a security threat not just in the United States, but to every single nation around this table."  Mr. Biden said the United States and Europe have already faced the consequences of the growing Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan. “It was from that remote area of the world that al-Qaida plotted 9/11.  It was from that same area that extremists planned virtually every major terrorist attack in Europe since 9/11, including the attacks on London and Madrid," the vice president said. Biden said Washington is interested in a strong and coherent NATO.  He says without **that the alliance will be unable to face the threats of the 21st century.**  This theme is likely to be taken up again next month, when European and U.S. leaders meet for a summit in France and Germany to mark NATO's 60th anniversary.  It also marks President Barack Obama's first trip to Europe since taking office in January.

# 2NC

#### Armed Forces refers to PEOPLE fighting

IHL Database 5 (<http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule4#Fn_80_2>, “ Ch 1, Rule 4: Armed Forces, accessed 7/28/13)

Rule 4. Definition of Armed Forces

Rule 4. The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.

Summary

State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in international armed conflicts. For purposes of the principle of distinction, it may also apply to State armed forces in non-international armed conflicts.[[1]](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule4" \l "Fn_80_1) 

International armed conflicts

This rule is set forth in Article 43(1) of Additional Protocol I.[[2]](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule4" \l "Fn_80_2)    
Many military manuals specify that the armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed groups which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.[[3]](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule4" \l "Fn_80_3)  This definition is supported by official statements and reported practice.[[4]](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule4" \l "Fn_80_4)  Practice includes that of States not, or not at the time, party to Additional Protocol I.[[5]](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule4" \l "Fn_80_5)    
In essence, this definition of armed forces covers all persons who fight on behalf of a party to a conflict and who subordinate themselves to its command. As a result, a combatant is any person who, under responsible command, engages in hostile acts in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict. The conditions imposed on armed forces vest in the group as such. The members of such armed forces are liable to attack.

#### And their ontology of war is bankrupt – the aff’s crisis-based politics ignore the omnipresence of militarism

Cuomo 96 (Chris J., Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence”, Hypatia, Volume 11, Number 4, Autumn 1996, pgs. 30-31, Fall, accessed via JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/3810390](http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810390))

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event--an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists---including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies--cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.1 Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

#### Framing Al Qaeda as a security threat causes permanent warfare – the permutation can’t overcome their initial representations

Jarvis 9 (Lee, Lecturer, Politics and International Relations @ Swansea University , “The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 1, February)

Although there may exist strategic, even normative, grounds for conceptualizing terrorism as a coherent object of knowledge, this essentialist orthodoxy is unfortunate for two reasons. First, by attributing terrorism an objective existence, mainstream terrorism studies offers very limited space for reflecting on the historical and social processes through which this identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted. With the interpretive, symbolic and discursive contexts of its creation – to say nothing of the power relations traversing these contexts – presumed largely irrelevant for under- standing this phenomenon, terrorism remains consistently and artificially detached from the processes of its construction. In this sense, we could do far worse than remember Foucault’s (1981: 67) famous cautionary note when encountering claims to speak the truth about terrorism: ‘We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher’. Foucault’s meta-theoretical caution will not, of course, convince everyone that further critical reflection in this field is needed. By turning to the very specific, and narrow, essence attributed to terrorism within the mainstream debates, however, it may be possible to garner further support for such a programme. As the above discussion suggests, existing studies remain overwhelmingly structured by a conception of their object as an unconventional form of illegitimate violence. With relatively few exceptions, the majority of scholars working here are content to tie their understanding of terrorism both to activities of particular non-state actors and to the targeting of particular victims: non-combatants or (more emotively) ‘innocent civilians’. With reflections on the nature and causes of terrorism already framed around this double condemnation, then, discussions relating to the legitimacy of terrorism, or, indeed, the possibility of state terrorism, become systematically excluded from this field of enquiry before they emerge. As outlined below, it is an attempt to contest these exclusionary practices that largely motivates the first, broadening, face of critical terrorism studies. Given the above preference for a specific and narrow essentialist framework, it is perhaps unsurprising that terrorism studies has oriented towards policy-relevant research. In seeking not only to define and explain, but also to prevent or resolve, its object of knowledge, this structuring of the discipline necessarily mobilizes a very limited conception of academic responsibility. In Cox’s (1996: 88) famous terminology, as noted by Gunning (2007), terrorism studies has overwhelmingly functioned as a problem-solving pursuit that: takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. As Cox’s remarks suggest, the problem-solving approach to the study of terrorism is normatively problematic in reducing academic responsibility to a technical exercise of risk governance or management. At best, such a reduction militates against any notion of critical enquiry aimed at contesting or destabilizing the status quo: of ‘saying the unsayable’ in Booth’s (2008: 68) terminology. At worst, it simply reifies a tired and unstable inside/outside dichotomy that legitimizes the state’s continued monopoly on violence. Either way, the continued structuring of the mainstream literature around the above debates fails to offer any meaningful participatory role for engaged, active scholarship. In sum, although characterized by considerable diversity, the terrorism studies literature suffers from key analytical and normative limitations. Analytically, the preference for a narrow essentialist framework not only neglects the processes of terrorism’s construction, it also reduces the space available for discussing the (il)legitimacy of particular violences. Norma- tively, the preference for producing policy-relevant, problem-solving research works to detach academic responsibility from any notion of critical enquiry. These limitations, I argue, open considerable space for the emergence of a critical terrorism studies agenda.

#### The aff’s attempts to increase the power gap lead to militaristic interventions that reproduce violence

Rule 10 (James B, PhD Harvard, MA Oxford, BA Brandeis, “The Military State of America and the Democratic Left”, Dissent Vol. 57 No 1, Winter)

The invasion of Iraq was a defining moment for the United States. This was the kind of war that many Americans believed formed no part of this country's repertoire - an aggressive war of choice. Its aim was not to stop some wider conflict or to prevent ethnic cleansing or mass killings; indeed, its predictable effect was to promote these things. The purpose was to extirpate a regime that the United States had built up but that had morphed into an obstacle to this country - and to replace it with one that would represent a more compliant instrument of American purpose. In short, the war was a demonstration of American ability and willingness to remove and replace regimes anywhere in the world. Even in the wake of the Iraq fiasco, no one in high places has declared repetitions of such exploits "off the table" - to use the expression favored by this country's foreign policy elites. For those of us who opposed the war, there is obvious relief at the conclusion - we hope - of a conflict that has consistently brought out the worst in this country. But at the same time, those on the democratic Left look to the future with unease. Even under a reputedly liberal president, we have reason to worry about new versions of Iraq - in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran or venues yet undisclosed. To its credit, Dissent has not joined the rush to avert attention from the endgames of the Iraq conflict. The Spring 2009 edition features a section of articles under the rubric "Leaving Iraq." The essays focus on the moral and political quandaries of America's departure from a country that it did a great deal to break, but where its ability to repair things is rapidly diminishing. But, a look at the proposals put forward there makes it clear that the thinking that gave us the American invasion of Iraq in the first place has not gone away. George Packer, for example, inveighs against those seeking a quick exit for American forces. The balance of power among Iraq's domestic forces could easily be upset, he holds, and valuable progress undone, without a longlingering presence of Americans as enforcers. Obviously playing to the sensitivities of Dissent readers, he concludes that "much as we might wish [the war] had never happened at all, America will have obligations as well as interests in Iraq for a long time to come." The sense of all this, from Packer's standpoint, becomes clear when you recall his efforts to discredit Americans' resistance to the war in the months before it began. The antiwar movement, he wrote in the New York Times Magazine in December, 2002, "has a serious liability . . . it's controlled by the furthest reaches of the American Left." He goes on, in this same article, to envisage a quite different role for those on the Left, like himself, who took what he considered a more enlightened view: The "liberal hawks could make the case for war to suspicious Europeans and to wavering fellow Americans," he wrote; "they might even be able to explain the connection between the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism ..." Brendan O'Leary, another contributor to Dissent's Spring 2009 "Leaving Iraq" section, also stresses responsibility. He, too, means by this continued readiness to apply U.S. coercion to manage Iraqi domestic politics. To judge from his words, he has no difficulty in principle with the notion of remaking Iraq by outside military force: "Reasonable historians should judge ... that removing the genocidal Baathists was overdue," he avers. "The younger Bush made up for his father's mistake, though he did so for the wrong reasons." Still, O'Leary allows that the invasion hasn't quite unfolded as he might have wished: "... grotesque mismanagement of regime-replacement ... unnecessary and arrogant occupation ... incompetence of American direct rule... numerous errors of policy and imagination ... in the horrors and brutalities that have followed." The America occupiers have sometimes proved "blindly repressive," he allows - but sometimes, apparently, not repressive enough. Still, leaving before America sets things straight would be irresponsible. If the United States just keeps trying, it may yet get it all right. This country must now manage the political forces set in motion by its invasion according to O'Leary's exacting formula: defend the federalist constitution, keep resurgent Sunni and Shiite forces from each other's throats, and preserve the autonomy of the Kurds. Just the same, he notes, "After the United States exits, an Arab civil war may re-ignite, as well as Kurdish-Arab conflict." To some of us, an invasion that leaves such possibilities simmering after six years of American-sponsored death and destruction itself seems more than a little irresponsible. Some of the aims invoked by Packer and O'Leary are beyond reproach. Certainly the United States bears profound responsibilities to protect Iraqis at risk from their collaboration with or employment by American forces - and for that matter, to help repair damage to the country's infrastructure resulting from the invasion. And certainly this country should do everything possible to prevent regional, communal, and ethnic groupings from exploiting a U.S. pullout to oppress others. But making good on any of these estimable goals, as the authors seem to realize, will be a very big order - especially given America's record thus far. Yet the deeper, mostly unstated assumptions underlying these authors' proposals ought to strike a chill throughout the democratic Left. Their problems with the Iraq invasion - and implicitly, future American military exploits of the same kind - have to do with execution, not the larger vision of American power that inspired the enterprise. Their words strike an eerie resonance with those of Thomas L. Friedman, before the invasion occurred: he favored George W. Bush's "audacious" war plan as "a job worth doing," but only "if we can do it right." America's violent remaking of Iraq would have been entirely acceptable, it seems, if only Friedman's sensibilities could have guided it. More important: the continuing mission of the United States as maker and breaker of regimes around the world remained unquestioned. When any country gets seriously in the way of American power, the global responsibilities of this country are apt to require action like that taken in Iraq. We hear this kind of thinking in its most outof-the-closet form from neoconservatives - who gave us the Iraq invasion in the first place. But its roots in American history lie at least as far back as notions of Manifest Destiny. Its key inspiration is a particularly aggressive form of American exceptionalism. Some higher power - fate, Divine Providence, or special "moral clarity" - has created opportunities, indeed obligations, for America to set things straight on a global scale. Versions of this idea are pervasive among thinkers - American foreign policy elites, and those who would guide them - who would disclaim identification with the neocons. Often conveying the doctrine are code words referring to special "responsibilities" of the United States to guarantee world "stability." Or, as Madeleine Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, stated, "If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future. . ." To her credit, Albright's effusions in this direction stopped short of support for invading Iraq - something that cannot be said for the so-called liberal hawks. Accepting this view of America as the ultimate and rightful arbiter of global affairs - as master hegemon or world superpower, to use less upbeat terms - triggers the weightiest implications and consequences. Nearly all of them, I hold, run in collision course to the best aims and directions of the democratic Left. Yet even for thinkers who identify themselves as being on the Left, acceptance of a hyper-militarized America, and its concomitant role of global enforcer, often passes without question. For those of us who challenge this view, the invasion of Iraq was wrong for fundamental political and - indeed - moral reasons. Not because it was mismanaged. Not because too few troops were dispatched; not because the Iraqi Army was disbanded; not because the occupation was incompetent, corrupt, and often criminally negligent. It was wrong because wars of this kind are always wrong - aggressive, opportunistic wars of choice, aimed at revamping entire countries to fit the dictates of the invaders. These wars are wrong because of the destruction and distortions that they spread both abroad and at home. Among nations, they countervail against one of the subtle but hopeful tendencies in the world today - the movement away from sole reliance on brute state power to resolve international conflict and toward supranational authorities, multilateral decisi on -making, and establishment of powers above the level of states. At home, the effects are even more insidious. For in order to make itself the kind of country capable of "projecting power" anywhere in the world, as America has done so unsuccessfully in Iraq, it has had to impose vast demands and distortions upon its own domestic life.

#### **1.** Not responsive – their impact scenarios are products of paranoia

Mack 88 (John E., Doctor of Psychiatry, Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard University, “The Enemy System (short version)”, John E. Mack institute, Originally published in the Lancet, August 13th, 1988, <http://johnemackinstitute.org/1988/08/the-enemy-system-short-version/>, we don’t endorse the card’s gendered discourse)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the “enemy system”[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding man as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: “I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition…MARKED AT COMPETITION

#### No US lashout

MacDonald ’11 (Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44, Spring 2011)

With regard to militarized disputes, declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes, and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2).68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist's argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers.

#### Attribution means terrorists wont get the weapons

**Lieber and Press 13 –** Keir A. Lieber is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department¶ of Government at Georgetown University. Daryl G. Press is Associate Professor of Government at¶ Dartmouth College. ( Lieber, Keir A.; Press, Daryl G. International Security. Summer2013, Vol. 38 Issue 1, p80-104. 25p. 1 Chart, 3 Graphs.

The United States and its allies should be able to deter nuclear-armed states¶ from passing their weapons to terrorists, because a terrorist nuclear strike¶ would not remain anonymous for long and would soon be traced back to the¶ originating state. This conclusion is based on two empirical findings. First,¶ among the relevant past cases of conventional terrorist attacks—those targeting¶ the homelands of powerful states and causing significant casualties—almost all¶ were successfully attributed to the perpetrating terrorist organization. Second,¶ linking the attributed terrorist organization to a state sponsor would not be¶ difficult. Few foreign terrorist organizations have state sponsors; those that do¶ typically have only one; and only one suspected state sponsor of terrorism¶ (Pakistan) has nuclear weapons or sufficient stockpiles of nuclear materials.

Furthermore, potential sponsors of nuclear terror face a wicked dilemma:¶ to maintain distance by passing the weapon to a terrorist group they do not¶ know well or trust, or to maintain control by giving it to a group they have cooperated¶ with repeatedly. The former strategy is mind-bogglingly dangerous;¶ the latter option makes attribution from terror group to sponsor simple.

Our findings have two important policy implications. First, the fear of nuclear¶ attack by proxy by itself does not justify costly military steps to prevent¶ nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation may pose a variety of other risks,¶ and the appropriate level of U.S. efforts to stop proliferation should depend on¶ the cumulative effect of these risks, but the dangers of a nuclear handoff to terrorists¶ have been overstated. For example, Iranian leaders would have to be¶ crazy or suicidal to think that they could give a nuclear weapon to one of their¶ terrorist collaborators and face no repercussions. If leaders were that irrational,¶ the bigger problem would be direct nuclear attack without concern for the¶ retaliatory consequences, not the alleged problem of a nuclear handoff.

A second implication is that instead of publicly stressing the dangers of¶ nuclear attack by proxy and lamenting the limits of U.S. nuclear forensic capabilities¶ (and thus potentially misleading enemies to overestimate the feasibility¶ of an anonymous attack against America), the United States should be advertising¶ its impressive record of attributing highly lethal terrorist attacks. Understating¶ one’s own capabilities is a reasonable strategy for luring an enemy into¶ making an unwise attack, but it is a disastrous policy if the goal is deterrence.¶ The most effective way to deter countries from passing weapons to terrorists is¶ to demonstrate the ease of nuclear attribution and the devastating consequences¶ of such attribution to the sponsoring state.

## 1NR

#### Diversionary theory means countries turn outward—causes conflict

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8 ([Aaron Friedberg](http://online.wsj.com/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=AARON+FRIEDBERG&ARTICLESEARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND) and [Gabriel Schoenfeld](http://online.wsj.com/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=GABRIEL+SCHOENFELD&ARTICLESEARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND) October 21, 2008 Mr. Friedberg is a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Mr. Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J. “The Dangers of a Diminished America | In the 1930s, isolationism and protectionism spurred the rise of fascism.” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>)

The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

#### Economic collapse kills hegemony

Pietroburgo 9 (Anthony, Political Scientist, “The End of American Hegemony,” April 10http://ezinearticles.com/?The-End-of-American-Hegemony&id=2207395: Ad 7-6-9)

However we can learn from past hegemonic states, all of which, withered away with time just as the American one is currently in the process of doing. Great Britain was perhaps the last true hegemon before that of the United States. Back in 1890 the collapse of their empire had just began. David A. Lake's research on the issue is work that should be greatly analyzed due to the illustrious similarities between the British recession in to retirement and the United States' as well. For much of the 19th century Great Britain was dominating in the same fields as the U.S. did so in the 1950's through the late 1970's. Soon in the later 1800's The United States and Germany moved to a protectionist system to plant their economic seeds and soon after were surpassing British industries and abilities. The industrial base of Great Britain crumbled and forced them to invest heavily in the service, shipping and insurance sectors of the economy just to break-even when concerning their balance of payment statistics. For the time being the British were able to carry on with the pound as the dominant world currency. The frail system was already on the thinnest of ice, when WWI confounded the weak British economy (Lake 122). At the time of Great Britain's reign of power they also pursued operations to completely open up and liberalize the world economy. This did lead to substantial brief economic abundance but eventually the struggles of remaining a strong enough power to be considered an absolute hegemon wore off. Hegemonic powers are only sustainable during periods of constant economic growth. When growth is no longer the complete and utter status of the hegemony's economic functionality the power ceases to be consistent. We see this to be the case with Great Britain, as other world powers emerged and caught up in terms of economic status and influence, British power that was exerted was much more explicit and coercive, just like it was during the American hegemonic era under President Nixon (Lake 121). It is safe to say that the U.S. is headed down the same path that will eventually end up being the ultimate de-throning of the American empire and it's hegemonic capabilities. If you think back to all the complications that the United States is experiencing in this very moment concerning obvious financial difficulties and others in the areas of education, technological innovation and healthcare respectively. Other nations have clearly started their own catch up phase and are impeding on American power as we speak. The irony between the situations leading up to the collapse of the British hegemonic state and the current burdens that are being placed upon a contemptuous American hegemon are too similar for coincidence. It took the disaster of WWI to finally destabilize the British hegemon and the United States is one major crisis away from experiencing the same fate (Bartilow Lecture).

#### Econ decline makes a major terrorist attack likely

Washington Post 8(“Experts See Security Risks in Downturn”, November, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/14/AR2008111403864.html)

Intelligence officials are warning that the deepening global financial crisis could weaken fragile governments in the world's most dangerous areas and undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to a new wave of security threats. U.S. government officials and private analysts say the economic turmoil has heightened the short-term risk of a terrorist attack, as radical groups probe for weakening border protections and new gaps in defenses. A protracted financial crisis could threaten the survival of friendly regimes from Pakistan to the Middle East while forcing Western nations to cut spending on defense, intelligence and foreign aid, the sources said. The crisis could also accelerate the shift to a more Asia-centric globe, as rising powers such as China gain more leverage over international financial institutions and greater influence in world capitals. Some of the more troubling and immediate scenarios analysts are weighing involve nuclear-armed Pakistan, which already was being battered by inflation and unemployment before the global financial tsunami hit. Since September, Pakistan has seen its national currency devalued and its hard-currency reserves nearly wiped out. Analysts also worry about the impact of plummeting crude prices on oil-dependent nations such as Yemen, which has a large population of unemployed youths and a history of support for militant Islamic groups. The underlying problems and trends -- especially regional instability and the waning influence of the West -- were already well established, but they are now "being accelerated by the current global financial crisis," the nation's top intelligence official, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, said in a recent speech. McConnell is among several top U.S. intelligence officials warning that deep cuts in military and intelligence budgets could undermine the country's ability to anticipate and defend against new threats. Annual spending for U.S. intelligence operations currently totals $47.5 billion, a figure that does not include expensive satellites that fall under the Pentagon's budget. At a recent gathering of geospatial intelligence officials and contractors in Nashville, the outlook for the coming fiscal cycles was uniformly grim: fewer dollars for buying and maintaining sophisticated spy systems. "I worry where we'll be five or 10 years from now," Charles Allen, intelligence director for the Department of Homeland Security, said in an interview. "I am deeply worried that we will not have the funding necessary to operate and build the systems already approved." Intelligence officials say they have no hard evidence of a pending terrorist attack, and CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said in a news conference Thursday that his agency has not detected increased al-Qaeda communications or other signs of an imminent strike. But many government and private terrorism experts say the financial crisis has given al-Qaeda an opening, and judging from public statements and intercepted communications, senior al-Qaeda leaders are elated by the West's economic troubles, which they regard as a vindication of their efforts and a sign of the superpower's weakness. "Al-Qaeda's propaganda arm is constantly banging the drum saying that the U.S. economy is on the precipice -- and it's the force of the jihadists that's going to push us over the edge," said Bruce Hoffman, a former scholar-in-residence at the CIA and now a professor at Georgetown University. Whether terrorist leader Osama bin Laden is technically capable of another Sept. 11-style attack is unclear, but U.S. officials say he has traditionally picked times of transition to launch major strikes. The two major al-Qaeda-linked attacks on U.S. soil -- the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the 2001 hijackings -- occurred in the early months of new administrations.

#### Government shutdown wrecks CDC disease monitoring – key to check outbreaks

Emily Walker, 4-8-2011, "Both Sides Claim Win as Shutdown Averted," Med Page Today, http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Washington-Watch/25826

The vast majority of employees at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would be furloughed if the government ceased operations, said an HHS spokesman. Because the CDC tracks new public health threats such as disease outbreaks, the worst-case scenario during a shutdown would be a massive outbreak of a food-borne illness or other communicable disease. The CDC's emergency operation center -- a command center for monitoring and coordinating CDC's emergency response to public health threats in the United States and abroad -- will remain open. The center is currently working on responses to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. But responses may be delayed, the spokesman said. "If a state were to call us and say 'We need help,' we may not be able to respond quickly," the spokesman said. While emergency workers will continue their jobs, the staff who work to "get people out the door," by booking travel and facilitating meetings, won't be working. "This would prevent us from responding as quickly as we'd like," the spokesman said. In addition, the CDC's ability to detect an outbreak could be jeapordized, he said. "We have a lot of disease surveillance networks. If those are scaled back to just the staff that monitor those networks, it could conceivably lead to us not being able to detect an outbreak as quickly as we'd like to. We simply won't have the manpower we have right now," the HHS spokesman said.

Disease causes extinction- prefer most recent evidence that takes their authors into account

Shapiro 9/16 (Eliza, is a reporter for The Daily Beast, covering breaking news, crime, and politics. Previously, she worked at Capital New York, September 16, 2013, “A Scarier Bird Flu: CDC Chief Warns of Looming H7N9 Threat”, http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors/eliza-shapiro.html///TS)

It was not an event for germophobes, as the CDC’s director described the crises Americans may soon face: an uncontainable virus, killer measles, and even the plague. ¶ Be afraid. Be very afraid.¶ While the U.S. public-health system has made major strides in stopping smoking and preventing HIV/AIDS, there is still [a slew of infectious diseases](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/07/drug-resistant-gonorrhea-the-sex-superbug-is-not-worse-than-aids.html), new and old, that all Americans need to start thinking about.¶ Centers for Disease Control director Thomas Frieden outlined the looming crises in a talk this week, focusing on awareness and prevention while still name dropping a lot of scary stuff: the plague, bird flu, and killer measles. It was not a day for germophobes.¶ Never heard of [H7N9 flu](http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm)? Well, you might soon. It’s a recently discovered form of bird flu that Frieden said “is acting quite a bit like SARS,” the viral respiratory infection that has killed more than 8,000 people and created a worldwide panic in 2003.¶ [H7N9](http://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2013/04/05/china-kills-birds-after-sixth-flu-death.html) is lethal and spreads faster than [any other identified strain of bird flu](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/14/flu-fears-the-race-between-pandemic-viruses-and-a-universal-vaccine.html). It moves from animals to humans, but, unlike previous versions of bird flu, doesn’t make animals sick. As a result, infected flocks can’t be contained, and there’s no effective vaccine.¶ This strain was discovered in China this past April. Of the 130 human infections reported, there were 44 deaths related to respiratory illnesses. Most of the infections were found in people with direct exposure to poultry.¶ Infections in China have tapered off, but this bird flu appears to be as seasonal as human flus, and may come back stronger as it gets colder.¶ “The only thing protecting us from a global pandemic right now is the fact that it doesn’t yet spread from person to person,” Frieden told the National Press Club on Tuesday. Gulp.¶ He’s also concerned about antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis, which he said is “spreading in long-term-care facilities and hospitals widely.” Then there are what the CDC calls “intentional diseases”—chemicals or diseases like anthrax, which could be used as biological weapons.¶ What’s highest on Frieden’s agenda? The plague.¶ After a person in rural Uganda was infected with the plague by a sick rat or flea [this year](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/cdc-fights-plague-uganda-eye-biodefense/), 130 people were given preventive medication by CDC workers. That infection was contained.¶ But this scourge of the Middle Ages could have a terrifying modern application, too: “Plague is one of the organisms that we’re concerned about in terms of its potentially being used as a bio weapon,” Frieden said.¶ Another illness you might want to start taking seriously: the measles. ¶ There are still over 400 deaths a day from measles around the planet, Frieden said, with plenty of infections in the U.S. from a malady he called “perhaps the most infectious of all the infectious diseases.”¶ “If you take, oh, let’s say a room with a couple hundred people in it, and there is one person coughing with measles and there are just three or four others who are susceptible, they’ll probably get it. It’s that infectious,” he said.¶ It wasn’t all bad news from Frieden.¶ The most preventable cause of death—smoking—has plummeted among Americans in recent years. Frieden pointed to CDC data that show more than 1 million Americans have tried to quit smoking, and 100,000 or more have quit smoking altogether. And, crediting the [President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief](http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm), Frieden said some 5.5 million more people are able to live full lives even if they are HIV-positive.¶ Still—what about H7N9, drug-resistant TB, measles … and the plague?¶

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling collapses the economy –

McAuliff 9/18/13 (Michael, Covers Congress for the Huffington Post, "Debt Limit Showdown Could be Catastrophic For Economy: Analysts")

Much like Democrats who released [their own report on the topic](http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=f1f34dc1-775b-4bc5-b1a1-739e963f0277), Zandi noted, however, that in the last showdown over the debt ceiling two years ago, the U.S. government's credit rating was downgraded and the stock market tanked.¶ "You can only put the gun to your head so many times before someone's going to make a mistake and pull the trigger, and it's to everyone's detriment," Zandi told Duffy.¶ He gave a crushing summary of the potential impacts of a default.¶ "If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's box. It will be devastating to the economy," he predicted. "If you don't do it in time, confidence will evaporate, consumer confidence will sharply decline, [as well as] investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."¶ "We'll be in the middle of a very, very severe recession, and I don't see how we get out of it," he added.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling collapses the economy – debt downgrades, stock market collapse, dip in consumer confidence

Barro 9/18/13 (Josh, Business Insider, "Two Charts That Show Why Another Debt Ceiling Fight is a Very Bad IDea")

Since Republicans in Congress seem intent on flirting (again) with hitting the debt ceiling, the Joint Economic Committee's Democratic staff is out with a report reminding us that doing so is a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad idea.¶ Here's what happens when you lead the financial markets to think the U.S. government might fail to pay its obligations:¶ Your debt gets downgraded (Standard & Poors cut the U.S. sovereign bond rating to AA+ as a result of the last crisis).¶ The stock market plunges (down 16% in three weeks during the last debt ceiling crisis).¶ Consumer confidence falls, which means people don't buy as much and the economy slows down. Last time, a deal to raise the debt ceiling was reached in August, but consumer confidence didn't reach pre-crisis levels until January 2012.¶ People arguing about economic policy talk a lot about "uncertainty," and usually they're B.S.ing. But the debt ceiling is one of the few topics where uncertainty is really the big deal.¶ When the government risks creating a payment crisis, people start to wonder whether they're going to get their Social Security checks or their paychecks or their bond interest. And they wonder what broader effects a payment crisis may have on the economy.¶ All that causes people to stop spending and prepare for crisis. It slows down the economy. And it makes us look stupid, as a country. We shouldn't do it.

#### -- Democrats are confident that the House will raise the debt ceiling now – high level statements prove

Bolton 9/14/13 (Alexander, Writer for the Hill, "Confident Democrats Want Separate Showdowns on Shutdown and Debt Limit")

¶ Senate Democrats want to have separate fights with the House GOP over a potential government shutdown and raising the nation’s debt limit, confident they will win showdowns on both issues. [[WATCH VIDEO](http://thehill.com/video/senate/322259-house-gop-prepares-for-last-fight-against-obamacare)]  Some House Republicans want to bundle the question of setting federal funding levels and raising the debt limit into one vote but a senior Senate Democrat has rejected that possibility. ¶ Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said repeatedly raising the debt limit in small increments wreaks havoc on government operations.¶ “The longer you extend the debt limit, the more thoughtless it is,” he said.¶ Durbin predicted Congress would tackle the debt limit question in mid October instead of pushing the debate until shortly before Christmas.¶ “October 15, mark your calendar,” he said. “I’m told that come October 15 we better start getting serious about it.”¶ Durbin said he wants extend the nation’s borrowing limit for as long as possible in one increment. He cited a year as a reasonable extension.¶ “We’re not going to be in the situation where you’re lurching from crisis to crisis and putting the full faith and credit [of the government] at the hands of a Republican caucus that can’t get it’s act together,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide. “Doing a longer term clean debt-limit extension will prevent that from happening.” Some House Republicans want to maximize their leverage by bundling the debt limit and stopgap measure funding government. They could accomplish this by extending government funding until mid-December and bumping up the debt limit just enough to delay a medium-term solution until year’s end.¶ Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.¶ “We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.¶ The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.  “If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”¶

#### -- Republicans will cave now

The Economist 9/21/13 (Print Edition of the Economist, "Once More to the Brink")

Strangely, the improving economics of the debt have done little for the rotten politics. Both the president and Republican leaders in Congress are anxious to avoid a repeat of their standoff in August 2011, when they brought America close to an unnecessary and catastrophic default by refusing to agree on the terms under which the debt ceiling should be raised.¶ In this section¶ [Style and substance](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586553-it-may-not-look-it-barack-obamas-presidency-tied-syria-style-and-substance)¶ Once more to the brink¶ [Tokers’ delight](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586584-sensible-drug-policy-decision-federal-government-once-tokers-delight)¶ [Mass shootings are up; gun murders down](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586585-mass-shootings-are-up-gun-murders-down)¶ [Of trolls and mistrials](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586543-idiotic-comments-derail-big-civil-rights-case-trolls-and-mistrials)¶ [The risk of rabid raccoons](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586542-using-marshmallow-treats-fight-deadly-disease-risk-rabid-raccoons)¶ [The American Dream, RIP?](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586581-economist-asks-provocative-questions-about-future-social-mobility-american)¶ [Reprints](http://www.economist.com/rights)¶ The “debt ceiling” is the legal limit to federal borrowing. Since the Treasury borrows 19 cents of every dollar it spends, Congress has to keep raising the debt ceiling or Uncle Sam will not be able to pay his bills. When Republicans and Democrats played chicken with the full faith and credit of the United States, it undermined confidence in the economy and dented the squabbling lawmakers’ approval ratings. Yet they seem poised to do it all again.¶ On October 1st much of the federal government will shut down unless Congress votes to fund the roughly 35% of the budget that requires annual authorisation. Then, around mid-October, the Treasury will hit the debt ceiling. Unless Congress votes to raise it, Treasury will have to stop paying bills such as salaries, pensions, and in the extreme, interest on the national debt, which would trigger a cataclysmic default.¶ In theory, a deal should be within grasp. Mr Obama would like to replace the so-called “sequester”—across-the-board spending cuts that resulted from that last showdown, in 2011—with more targeted spending cuts and higher taxes. But with no leverage to force the Republicans to agree, he would almost certainly sign a budget that kept funding at the sequester’s levels. He also wants the debt ceiling raised with no strings attached. Since Republicans did that last January, they should be prepared to do so again.¶ But several dozen conservative Republican congressmen are blocking the way. They want to use the budget and the debt ceiling to gut Mr Obama’s healthcare plan, the main provisions of which are scheduled to take effect by January. So far, 74 of the 233 House Republicans have sponsored a bill that would wipe out any funds for implementing Obamacare next year, while funding the rest of the government.¶ Mr Obama, however, has vowed not to delay Obamacare or negotiate over the debt ceiling. This has saddled Republican leaders with a dilemma: how to satisfy their members’ Quixotic longing to kill Obamacare without committing political suicide by shutting down the government or causing a default. Last week John Boehner, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Eric Cantor, the Majority Leader, proposed passing two bills, one that defunded Obamacare, and another that funded the government. The Senate could reject the first and pass the second.

#### -- Obama is pushing

Feldmann 9/18/13 (Linda, Christian Science Monitor, "Government shutdown coming? Boehner raises stakes on defunding Obamacare")

As for Obama, even before Boehner’s capitulation to the tea party wing of his caucus, efforts to woo the Republicans into a budget deal have born no fruit, and so he has opted for verbal slaps. On Monday, the president took to a [White House](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/The+White+House) stage to mark the five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial crisis, and he spewed vitriol at his most ardent opponents – even though a mass shooting had just taken place a few miles from the White House.¶ "I cannot remember a time when one faction of one party promises economic chaos if it doesn't get 100 percent of what it wants," Obama said.¶ At Wednesday’s briefing, White House press secretary [Jay Carney](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Jay+Carney) suggested that the president’s past charm offensive with Republicans – including taking some out to dinner at an expensive restaurant (on his dime) – hadn’t completely failed.¶ “What we discovered is that there is a sincere desire by Republican lawmakers, some of them, anyway ... to make budget policy that ... reduces the deficit responsibly, but invests responsibly as well,” Mr. Carney said.¶ And, he said, the president will still try “all manner of ways to get to yes with Republican leaders.”

#### - Obama has the momentum

Easley 9/18/13 (Jason, "Obama's Genius Labeling of GOP Demands Extortion Has Already Won the Debt Ceiling Fight")

President Obama effectively ended any Republican hopes of getting a political victory on the debt ceiling when he called their demands extortion. Nobody likes being extorted. The American people don’t like feeling like they are being shaken down. The White House knows this, which is why they are using such strong language to criticize the Republicans. Obama is doing the same thing to House Republicans that he has been doing to the entire party for the last few years. The president is defining them before they can define themselves.¶ Obama is taking the same tactics that he used to define Mitt Romney in the summer of 2012 and applying them to John Boehner and his House Republicans. While Republicans are fighting among themselves and gearing up for another pointless run at defunding Obamacare, the president is already winning the political battle over the debt ceiling. His comments today were a masterstroke of strategy that will pay political dividends now and in the future. If the president is successful anytime a Republican talks about defunding Obamacare, the American people will think extortion. Republicans keep insisting on unconstitutional plots to kill Obamacare, and the [president is calling them out on it.](http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/15/obama-turns-tables-tells-republicans-debt-ceiling-demands-unconstitutional.html) Republicans haven’t realized it yet, but while they are chasing the fool’s gold of defunding Obamacare they have already lost on the debt ceiling. By caving to the lunatic fringe in his party, John Boehner may have [handed control of the House of Representatives back to Democrats on a silver platter.](http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/17/wall-street-journal-warns-gop-government-shutdown-give-democrats-house.html) While Republicans posture on Obamacare, Obama is routing them on the debt ceiling.

#### Debates about nukes will succumb to partisan infighting and cost political capital

#### Rubner 00 (Michael, Prof @ James Madison College @ Michigan State University, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Post Cold War Era” 9 MSU-DCL J. Int’l L. 271, Lexis)

Numerous proposals have been brought forth to align America's nuclear weapons policy with the new political realities of the post Cold War era. These include adopting a "no-first-use" posture, reducing the arsenal well below the numerical levels envisioned for START III, abandoning the quest for a nation-wide missile defense system, eliminating the land-based leg of the strategic triad, destroying the  [\*280]  arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, decoupling warheads from missiles, and partially dismantling missiles. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.121464.41170621358&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1254181627234&returnToKey=20_T7450986233&parent=docview" \l "n31) There are several reasons why most of these recommended changes are not likely to be adopted in the near future. First, as clearly demonstrated by the fierce debates over the 1993-94 Nuclear Posture Review and the Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, there are deeply entrenched bureaucratic interests that have a vested interest in the status quo and thus resist significant change. Second, contrary to the claims of the advocates for change, it is not at all self-evident that their proposals will necessarily accomplish those goals which they value and hope to achieve. For example, it is not at all clear whether radical reductions of nuclear warheads to levels well below 500 or even 100 per side will enhance or endanger stable deterrence between the U.S. and Russia. Likewise, there are strong disagreements among and between academics and government officials regarding the likely impact on stable deterrence and nonproliferation of such policies as "no-first-use," negative security assurances to nonnuclear states, lowering the alert rates of strategic nuclear forces, adopting complete bans on the testing of nuclear weapons and deploying a nation-wide ABM system. The sad fact remains that more than five decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we still know little about those factors that lead to and detract from stable deterrence and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Third, as we are clearly reminded by the Senate's rejection of the CTBT and the Congressional push for an NMD system, the legislative branch has at least some say in determining a portion of this country's nuclear weapons policy. In these two instances, Congress was either able to veto a reform favored by liberals (the CTBT) or to lend support to a policy favored by conservatives (the NMD).Lastly, with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S. as the unrivaled superpower, the broad bipartisan consensus that helped to shape this country's nuclear weapons policy has evaporated as well. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the CTBT fell victim to unabashed and blatant partisan politics, and that President Clinton succumbed to Republican pressures with his decision to sign the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 in order to deprive the GOP of a  [\*281]  potentially damaging campaign issue. With the growing intrusion of partisan and electoral politics into the policy making process, there is less likelihood that America's nuclear posture will change either quickly or substantially.

#### Military Industrial Complex would oppose NFU. Sunk costs in nuclear weapons make them highly profitable.

**Guangqian and Yu 2009**

Peng **Guangqian** editor-in-chief of Strategic Sciences and has long been engaged in research on military strategy and international affairs **AND** Rong **Yu** is a Ph. D. candidate at the Institute of International Strategy and Development, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua Uni­versity. **2009** China Security, Vol. 5 No. 1 Winter 2009, pp. 78-87 www.washingtonobserver.org/pdfs/Peng\_and\_Rong.pdf

Therefore, for states that possess large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and have established nuclear doctrines and postures tailored for first use of nuclear weapons, the cost invested may be highly prohibitive to considering alternative poli­cies. A credible NFU pledge would require such states to make substantial changes to their first-use oriented arsenals, delegation of authority and force deployment. As a domestic player, **the military-industrial complex** involved in the development and production of nuclear weapons would be opposed to any decline in the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy and would form an obstacle to NFU policy.

#### Congressional backlash against presidential military powers drains political capital- empirically proven

Kriner, 10 -- Boston University political science professor [Douglas, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, 67-69, google books, accessed 6-7-13, mss]

¶ Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction-particularly congressional opposition-to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"-Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur-explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand-yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea." While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, **congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front** by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection pros- pects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races." Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to Presi- dent George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War."" **In addition to boding ill for the president's** perceived **political capital** and reputation, **such** partisan **losses in Congress** only further **imperil his programmatic agenda**, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson`s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's highest second-term domestic priorities, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq."¶ When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely con- sider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If **congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda**, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Winners lose specifically for Obama’s second term

Walsh 12 Ken covers the White House and politics for U.S. News. “Setting Clear Priorities Will Be Key for Obama,” 12/20, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/Ken-Walshs-Washington/2012/12/20/setting-clear-priorities-will-be-key-for-obama

And there is an axiom in Washington: Congress, the bureaucracy, the media, and other power centers can do justice to only one or two issues at a time. Phil Schiliro, Obama's former liaison to Congress, said Obama has "always had a personal commitment" to gun control, for example.¶ But Schiliro told the New York Times, "Given the crisis he faced when he first took office, there's only so much capacity in the system to move his agenda." So Obama might be wise to limit his goals now and avoid overburdening the system, or he could face major setbacks that would limit his power and credibility for the remainder of his presidency.

#### Link outweighs on timeframe — replenishment takes too long

Lashof 10 Director of the Climate Center at NRDC (Dan, “Coulda, Shoulda, Woulda: Lessons from Senate Climate Fail”, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dlashof/coulda\_shoulda\_woulda\_lessons.html)

Lesson 2: Political capital is not necessarily a renewable resource. Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I’m sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success. A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama’s political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital and created the Tea Party movement. Public support for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. But this is occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama’s political capital in time to help push climate legislation across the finish line.

#### Obama is velcro and will only get blamed—no credit

Nicholas & Hook 10 Peter and Janet, Staff Writers—LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro.¶** Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become **ensnared in blame**.¶ Hoping to **better insulate Obama**, White House aides have sought to **give other Cabinet officials a higher profile** and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ **But Obama remains the colossus of his administration** — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape¶ What's **not sticking to Obama** is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. **Political dividends** from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill **have been fleeting**.¶ Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."¶ Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration.¶ Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants.¶ Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole.¶ "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said.¶ But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish.¶ Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal."¶ Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise.¶ A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year.¶ At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways.¶ Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower.¶ Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize.¶ Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in.¶ "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit.¶ **Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible**. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. **Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss**.¶ But **the Obama administration is about one man**. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. **No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate**. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end.¶ So, **more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him**. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding.¶ Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times.¶ "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen."¶ A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions.¶ But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda.